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United States Policy and Norwegian Commercial 
Whaling: A Cooperative Approach 
Jamie Nystrom* 
“There go the ships: there is that leviathan, whom thou hast made to 
play therein.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Both the United States and Norway have a long history of commer-
cial whaling, but the mantle of dominance in the whaling world passed 
from the United States to Norway in the mid-nineteenth century.2 As 
demand for whale-based products declined in the United States over the 
past century, and environmentalism and conservationism became more 
popular public ideologies, the United States shifted from a pro-whaling 
nation to, effectively, an anti-whaling nation.3  Norway, however, has 
continued to be the only nation that openly engages in commercial whal-
ing for profit,4 albeit on a smaller scale in comparison to historical prac-
                                                 
* J.D. Candidate, Seattle University School of Law, 2014 . 
 1. Psalms 104:26 (King James). 
 2. See J.N. TONNESSEN & A.O. JOHNSEN, THE HISTORY OF MODERN WHALING 11 (R.I. 
Christophersen trans., Univ. Cal. Press 1982). 
 3. See Gerry J. Nagtzaam, The International Whaling Commission and the Elusive Great White 
Whale of Preservationism, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 404 (2009). 
 4. See Cliff M. Stein, Comment, Whales Swim for Their Lives As Captain Ahab Returns in a 
Norwegian Uniform: An Analysis of Norway’s Decision to Resume Commercial Whaling, 8 TEMP. 
INT’L & COMP. L.J. 155, 156 (1994). 
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tice.5 The United States’ past efforts to pressure Norway to ban whaling 
have been largely unsuccessful.6 The best way for the United States to 
meet long-term conservation goals with respect to imposing international 
regulation on Norwegian commercial whaling is to change from its cur-
rent policy—trying to get Norway to stop its formal objection to the In-
ternational Whaling Commission’s (IWC) moratorium on commercial 
whaling—to working cooperatively with Norway through international 
law by supporting a lift on the ban and finding a scientifically sustainable 
quota for the yearly catch. 
Part II of this Note provides a brief history of commercial whaling, 
the events that led to the formation of the IWC, and the eventual ban on 
commercial whaling. Next, Part III discusses how previous attempts un-
der international and domestic law to force Norway to sign on to the ban 
have been ineffective and may possibly contribute to the disintegration of 
the IWC as a functioning international body. Part IV argues that, as a 
major force in international law and policy, the United States has an op-
portunity to meet its own conservation goals while cooperatively work-
ing with Norway to agree to scientifically sustainable quotas in a way 
that will preserve the IWC as the international body governing whaling. 
Finally, Part V offers a brief conclusion. 
II. HISTORY OF COMMERCIAL WHALING 
A brief history of commercial whaling is required to understand 
why whaling is important to Norway as part of its cultural heritage, why 
international regulation of whaling is necessary, and the present difficul-
ties in regulating whaling. 
A. From Old to Modern Whaling 
Whaling is an ancient practice because whales have many uses as a 
natural resource. Whales are massive aquatic mammals. The blue whale 
is “the largest mammal that has ever existed on this earth.”7 The minke 
whale is primarily hunted today because it is a viable alternative to tak-
                                                 
 5. See A.W. Harris, The Best Scientific Evidence Available: The Whaling Moratorium and 
Divergent Interpretations of Science, 29 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 400 (2005) 
(noting that the declining trend is subject to variance). 
 6. See Sonja Marta Halverson, Note, Small State with a Big Tradition: Norway Continues 
Whaling at the Expense of Integration and Nordic Cooperation, 31 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 
121, 128–29 (2004). 
 7. TONNESSEN & JOHNSEN, supra note 2, at 3. The blue whale can weigh up to 150 tons and 
produce fifty-two tons of oil, weighing about as much as twenty-five elephants or 150 big oxen. Id. 
at 5. 
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ing larger protected species.8 Whales have a great variety of uses because 
almost every part has value, ranging from food, soap, and perfume, to 
margarine, paint, and industrial lubricants.9 As a result, it is unsurprising 
that they have been sought after as a commercial resource.10 Norway’s 
primary interest has been commercial whaling for profit from the above-
mentioned industrial uses.11 Commercial whaling with the primary pur-
pose of attaining whale meat for human consumption, however, occurs 
only in Japan12—a phenomenon that has led to an entirely different set of 
international legal issues, which is beyond the scope of this Note. 
Whaling as a practice dates back to prehistoric eras13 but can be di-
vided into two general periods: old and modern. Larger-scale, organized 
efforts under old whaling are attributed first to the Basques in the Bay of 
Biscay circa the eleventh century C.E.14 As the centuries passed, methods 
improved, boats grew in size, and the range of whaling had crossed the 
Atlantic, reaching the Arctic by the seventeenth century.15 Modern whal-
ing began in the 1860s and is marked by changes in techniques, technol-
ogies, and the species of whales principally hunted.16 
One of the major distinctions between old and modern whaling is 
that “right whales” were sought after in old whaling, whereas “rorqual 
whales” are prized in modern whaling.17 Right whales were easier to 
catch than rorqual whales because they were slow moving and their bod-
ies continued to float after they were killed; it was not until more modern 
                                                 
 8. See id. at 5. Whales are divided into two main groups: whalebone and toothed. Aside from 
sperm whales, which are toothed, most commercial whaling is based around whalebone whales, 
which are divided into three general families: right whales, gray whales, and rorqual whales; minkes 
are rorquals. Id. at 3–5. 
 9. See Lisa Kobayashi, Lifting the International Whaling Commission’s Moratorium on Com-
mercial Whaling As the Most Effective Global Regulation of Whaling, 29 ENVIRONS: ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y J. 177, 179 (2006). 
 10. See id. 
 11. See generally TONNESSEN & JOHNSEN, supra note 2. 
 12. See id. at 52–53. 
 13. PATRICIA BIRNIE, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF WHALING: FROM CONSERVATION OF 
WHALING TO CONSERVATION OF WHALES AND REGULATION OF WHALE-WATCHING, VOL. 1, 65 
(Oceana Pub. 1985). Whale drawings have been found in Norway dating back to nearly 2200 B.C.E., 
suggesting hunting may have occurred. Id. 
 14 . Such early efforts were mostly confined to coastal areas and small watercraft. See 
Nagtzaam, supra note 3, at 389. 
 15. ELIZABETH DESOMBRE, THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT AND WORLD POLITICS 150 (Continu-
um Int’l Publishing Group, 2d ed. 2007). The English and Dutch were major whalers by this time, 
hunting primarily in Arctic waters. See Nagtzaam, supra note 3, at 389. 
 16. See TONNESSEN & JOHNSEN, supra note 2, at 3. 
 17. See id. at 6. Right whales were named as such because they were the “right” whale to 
catch. Id. 
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techniques and technology developed that the faster rorquals were able to 
be killed and caught before they sank.18 
By the time Americans became involved in the whaling industry in 
the mid-eighteenth century, the British, French, and Germans had already 
hunted right whales in the Bay of Biscay and Greenland to near extinc-
tion.19 The Americans then led the way to new grounds in the Southern 
Hemisphere, but between the time of the United States’ Civil War and 
the end of the nineteenth century, whaling had died out as an industry in 
the United States.20 The near-extinction of right whales by the latter half 
of the nineteenth century made the catching of rorquals essentially im-
perative for the industry to continue.21 
The solution to the rorqual problem would soon propel Norway to 
dominance in the whaling industry and give rise to the need for regula-
tion. The father of modern whaling—who saved the industry from the 
crisis of the depletion of right whales and enabled the taking of 
rorquals—was a Norwegian named Svend Foyn, who began experiment-
ing with new methods off the northern coasts of Finnmark in the 1860s.22 
The Foyn method was novel in that it used steam-driven whaling boats 
and grenade-tipped harpoons fired from cannons with a line connecting 
the harpoon to the ship.23 These technological innovations gave Norway 
an unparalleled advantage in the whaling industry, and as the industry 
spread globally through the 1920s, Norway quickly became the industry 
leader: first exhausting North Atlantic stocks, then declaring a moratori-
um in all Norwegian waters, and finally becoming the first nation to start 
operations in the Antarctic.24 One of the important changes that kept the 
use of whale oil relevant in the twentieth century was the invention of 
                                                 
 18. See id. 
 19. See Stein, supra note 4, at 158–59. 
 20. See id. As the Industrial Revolution spurred economic changes in the United States towards 
internal expansion and development of its vast land resources, skilled workers onshore could earn 
two to three times the wage of a whaler, and as a result, its whaling fleet lost its supply of workers. 
See TONNESSEN & JOHNSEN, supra note 2, at 12–13. At the same time, Norway experienced the 
second largest population growth in Europe (following Ireland) and pushed its development out-
wards, resulting in a stream of immigrants to the United States and a ready supply of young men to 
man the merchant and whaling fleets who could earn two to three times as much wages at sea as 
opposed to onshore. Id. 
 21. See id. at 6. Interestingly enough, no whaling was carried out from Norwegian shores in the 
middle of the nineteenth century. Id. There seems to be no special circumstances that made it inevi-
table that Norway would become the world leader in whaling. Id. at 11. 
 22. See id. at 6–7. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See Stein, supra note 4, at 160–61. Given the presence of Norwegian whalers in the Arctic 
and Antarctic, the prominence of Norwegian explorers in the same regions seems less surprising. See 
TONNESSEN & JOHNSEN, supra note 2, at 71. 
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hydrogenation, which meant that whale oil could be used in important 
products like margarine and industrial lubricants, and not only the tradi-
tional uses like lighting, lubrication, and soap.25 
Modern whaling had thus gone through two initial stages—the 
Finnmark Coast period (1864–1904) and the global expansion period 
(1883–1924)—and moved into the final “pelagic” stage (1925–present), 
which is characterized by whaling in the open ocean with floating facto-
ries, compared to shore-based whaling, where the carcasses would be 
dragged back to a shore facility for processing.26 The newly effective 
methods of whaling would result in attempts by national governments 
and, eventually, international bodies to regulate the industry. 
B. The Rise of International Regulation 
Regulation in the whale industry likewise followed the develop-
ment of modern whaling in three general stages: free whaling; local or 
national regulation; and international regulation.27  The effects of free 
whaling were seen above with the near extinction of right whales, but 
when similar signs began to appear in rorqual stocks, history was not 
doomed to repeat itself. Depletion of stocks in the North Atlantic spurred 
the Scandinavian nations to national-level regulation of the whaling in-
dustry in the early twentieth century, with the purpose of preserving 
whale stocks as a valuable resource.28 As management of global marine 
resources began to become a relevant state interest in the early twentieth 
century, the states with the greatest interest in collecting whales became 
the states that managed them.29 
National and international regulation of whales was largely ineffec-
tive because of the foundations of the legal status of whales as a form of 
resource. A state’s jurisdiction over coastal waters historically only ex-
tended three nautical miles from shore. Beyond that point, the waters 
were aqua nullius, meaning that the resources belonged to no one and 
were free for the taking in essentially an anarchic zone of the high sea.30 
                                                 
 25. See TONNESSEN & JOHNSEN, supra note 2, at 7. 
 26. See id. 
 27. See id. at 9. 
 28. See Nagtzaam, supra note 3, at 391–92. Measures included the first ever moratorium on 
whaling by Iceland for twenty years in 1915 and laws in Norway limiting the number of stations and 
catchers. See id. 
 29. See id. at 392. For example, the International Council for Exploration of the Sea created the 
Whaling Commission, which in 1927 tried to regulate the open slaughter approach to whaling un-
successfully. See id. at 392–93. 
 30. See TONNESSEN & JOHNSEN, supra note 2, at 8–9. States applied the doctrine mare liberum 
(freedom of access to the seas), which had been formulated by Grotius in 1608 in order to justify the 
right of the Dutch to sail freely to the East Indies, but had been misinterpreted to apply to fishing 
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Because no state could regulate the high seas and whales were viewed as 
a common resource from which no one could be excluded, the resource 
was prone to overexploitation. Under these circumstances, the short-term 
incentive was to maximize profits from the resource before others de-
pleted it, rather than to manage it for long-term benefit.31 Given the lack 
of short-term incentives to cooperate, it is no surprise that national and 
private attempts at self-regulation were doomed to fail. Indeed, even 
most attempts at international regulation have failed miserably. 
The whaling industry has not been able to limit takings of whales 
very well for a variety of reasons: inadequate scope of the regulations, 
lack of adequate scientific knowledge, important whaling states not co-
operating, lack of enforcement, no international observers, and a general 
lack of interest by the international community.32 The whaling industry 
and various nations were stirred to action in the 1930s when the catch of 
blue whales had increased so much that it depressed global oil prices, 
spurring the whaling industry to realize that the existing various national-
level controls were ineffective and that whales needed to be kept from 
extinction in order to maintain profits.33 In response, in 1931, the League 
of Nations created the first international body to regulate whaling: the 
first Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (Convention). 34  This 
Convention applied to all waters of the member states, enforced vessel 
licensing requirements, and also exempted aboriginal takings. 35  Even 
though the Convention was an achievement in that it was the first time 
conservation was applied to whaling on a global scale, it failed because 
unlike the older, established industry leaders, such as Norway and the 
United States, the newer, large whaling powers of Japan, Germany, and 
the USSR all refused to sign on because it was not in their economic in-
terest.36 
Frustrated by the Convention’s inability to effectively regulate, the 
industry created a cartel-like private organization known as the Interna-
                                                                                                             
rights that Grotius recognized as exhaustible and, therefore, subject to control. See BIRNIE, supra 
note 13, at 88; see also generally HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS OR THE RIGHT 
WHICH BELONGS TO THE DUTCH TO TAKE PART IN THE EAST INDIAN TRADE (Ralph Van Deman 
Magoffin trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1916) (1608). The result of this state of international law gave 
rise to such quintessential phenomena as the golden age of piracy in the Caribbean and privateering 
contracts, both of which are beyond the scope of this Note. 
 31. See Nagtzaam, supra note 3, at 390–91. The fight to secure relative gains of a scarce re-
source led to a classic instance of the “tragedy of the commons.” Id. 
 32. See BIRNIE, supra note 13, at 129–30. 
 33. See Nagtzaam, supra note 3, at 393. 
 34. Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Sept. 24, 1931, 155 L.N.T.S. 349. 
 35. Id. at arts. 1, 3, 8, 9. 
 36. See Nagtzaam, supra note 3, at 393–94. 
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tional Association of Whaling Companies, which attempted to limit 
global production of whale oil in order to keep prices in check.37 The 
first attempt by the major Antarctic whaling companies at self-regulation 
was defeated in the 1933–1934 season due to defections by two British 
companies and one Norwegian company; so naturally, all restraint was 
lost the next season and the total number of takings increased.38 The 
plans of mice and men, it seems. 
In 1937, another attempt was made at international regulation: the 
International Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling, along with a 
single protocol to it amended a year later.39 Once again, these were large-
ly ineffective because they were not ratified by all the major whaling 
states.40 In the wake of an additional failed attempt at regulation, the 
catch in the 1937–1938 season reached yet another all-time high.41 
By the mid-1930s, Norway’s dominance in the whaling industry 
was uncontested.42 Norway was responsible for nearly half of the takings 
and oil production, and most men employed in the industry—even at 
companies not controlled by Norwegians—were Norwegian.43 Not even 
World War II put a complete stop to Norwegian whaling efforts, but the 
post-war years would see Japan and the USSR overtake Norway’s lead-
ing position.44  
C. Formation of the International Whaling Commission 
The realization that diminishing stocks would mean not only the ex-
tinction of whales but also the extinction of the whaling industry spurred 
all sides to come together to treat whales not as resources of individual 
states, but as a shared global resource.45 The general respite granted to 
whales by the onset of World War II may have kept some major whale 
species from extinction as the catch level fell to ten percent of pre-war 
levels.46 Before the end of the war, the whaling nations agreed to limit 
the size of the catch by using a “standardized” measure: the Blue Whale 
Unit (BWU), which was a measure of the amount of oil that could be 
                                                 
 37. See id. at 394. 
 38. See id. 
 39. International Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling, June 8, 1937, 190 L.N.T.S. 79; 
Protocol Amending the International Agreement of June 8th, 1937, for the Regulation of Whaling, 
June 24, 1938, 196 L.N.T.S. 131. 
 40. See SIMON LYSTER, INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 18 (1985). 
 41. See BIRNIE, supra note 13, at 129. 
 42. See Stein, supra note 4, at 162. 
 43. See id. 
 44. See id. at 162–63. 
 45. See Nagtzaam, supra note 3, at 397. 
 46. Id. at 396. 
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taken regardless of which species it came from, with one BWU being the 
amount of oil that would come from one blue whale.47 Shortages of edi-
ble fats prompted the victorious Allies to prepare for orderly post-war 
takings, agreeing to limit the catch to 16,000 BWUs for the 1945–1946 
season; however, due to sharp demand, the BWU limit quickly increased 
to 43,378 BWUs by the following two seasons.48 
As the United States emerged from the ashes of World War II as a 
new world leader intent on creating a new world political order in its 
own image, it took charge in looking at the issues surrounding commer-
cial whaling by calling for a new international conference in Washing-
ton, D.C.49 Following the United States’ leadership, fifteen whaling na-
tions signed on to the International Convention for the Regulation of 
Whaling (ICRW) in 1946, including, for the first time, a major whaling 
state that had previously refused to sign international agreements: the 
USSR.50 Norway was a founding member and has remained a member 
since 1946.51 
The purpose of the ICRW, as was stated in the preamble, was to 
“provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks and thus make pos-
sible the orderly development of the whaling industry.”52 Although the 
preamble mostly contains language couched in terms of the industry’s 
interests,53 the preamble also included for the first time some important 
conservationist language: “Recognizing the interest of the nations of the 
world in safeguarding for future generations the great natural resources 
represented by the whale stocks.”54 This signaled a change in the ap-
proach the world community would take to whaling regulation; the rea-
sons for regulating were no longer simply to control competition and 
maintain profits. 
The ICRW created the International Whaling Commission (IWC)55 
to implement the economic and environmental goals of the ICRW.56 The 
                                                 
 47. Id. The problems inherent in such a measure are easily imagined when one considers the 
variance in size of any species of whale. 
 48. Id. at 397. 
 49. Id. at 397–98. 
 50. See Stein, supra note 4, at 164. The fifteen member states were: Argentina, Australia, Bra-
zil, Canada, Chili, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, South Africa, 
the former Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. International Convention for 
the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72 [hereinafter ICRW]. 
 51. See Stein, supra note 4, at 164. 
 52. ICRW, supra note 50. 
 53. E.g., id. (“Recognizing that the whale stocks are susceptible of natural increases if whaling 
is properly regulated, and that increases in the size of whale stocks will permit increases in the num-
bers of whales which may be captured without endangering these natural resources.”). 
 54. Id. 
 55. See id. at art. III. 
2014] U.S. Policy and Norwegian Commercial Whaling 1439 
IWC Schedule, which was created under the ICRW, set limits on catches 
but was not directly enforceable by the IWC.57 Rather, the ICRW provid-
ed that each contracting government would take appropriate enforcement 
measures against persons and vessels under its own maritime jurisdic-
tion.58 An important provision was that any nation could join the IWC if 
it agreed to abide by the ICRW,59 which reflects a view that whales are 
the property of the entire world and not just whaling nations.60 While the 
members of the IWC may amend the Schedule, they may not amend the 
Convention itself.61 The binding regulations are made in the Schedule, 
which can only be amended by a three-fourths vote.62 Such amendments 
must be “necessary to carry out the objectives and purposes of this Con-
vention and to provide for the conservation, development, and optimum 
utilization of the whale resources.”63 The Schedule regulates five general 
categories: (1) quota limitations based on size and species; (2) open and 
closed areas; (3) seasonal and regional limitations for pelagic hunting; 
(4) treatment after killing; and (5) supervision and control.64 Amend-
ments are supposed to be based on scientific findings, so in theory, both 
the United States and Norway agree that the findings of the Scientific 
Committee of the IWC should be the foundation of all regulation.65 
Another important provision is that member states can “opt out” of 
any provision if they file a timely objection to an amendment.66 The IWC 
can also make non-binding recommendations to member states on mat-
ters that relate to whales, whaling, and the object and purpose of the 
ICRW.67 Armed with such tools, the IWC thus set out to regulate com-
mercial whaling, which would not initially prove to be any more success-
ful than previous attempts. 
                                                                                                             
 56. See Halverson, supra note 6, at 124. 
 57. ICRW, supra note 50, at art. I. 
 58. Id. at art. IX. 
 59. Id. at art. X(4). 
 60. See Nagtzaam, supra note 3, at 399. 
 61. See Kobayashi, supra note 9, at 189. 
 62. ICRW, supra note 50, at arts. I, III(2), V(1).  
 63. Id. at art. V(2). 
 64. Kobayashi, supra note 9, at 190. 
 65. ICRW, supra note 50, at art. V(2). However, actual disagreement over what constitutes 
scientific findings in the IWC suggests that the language of the Convention is somewhat hortatory on 
this point. See infra Part IV. 
 66. ICRW, supra note 50, at art. V(3). 
 67. Id. at art. VI. 
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D. Moratorium to Present 
Regulation of the whaling industry in the post-war years generally 
failed because the quota system was inaccurate, it was difficult to divide 
between the whaling states, and the states loathed giving up their pre-
existing allocations; therefore, whale populations continued to diminish, 
raising concerns in the larger global community.68 As the industrial needs 
for whale oil were replaced by petroleum products, attitudes towards 
whaling shifted in many nations that did not have a history of consuming 
whale meat.69 
Starting in the 1970s, environmentalism grew as a movement and 
soon turned its attention to whaling.70  Various environmental groups 
were largely effective in destroying the market for whaling products by 
the use of various organized efforts, including international conventions, 
boycotts, and propaganda against whale products.71 Such efforts at bring-
ing public sympathies worldwide to the side of anti-whaling nations, 
coupled with recruiting efforts in the IWC, shifted the makeup of the 
IWC. By the early 1980s, anti-whaling forces in the IWC constituted a 
three-quarters majority, and under United States’ leadership, it imposed a 
total moratorium on commercial whaling in 1982.72 
The moratorium affected the nations opposed to it in various ways. 
Japan initially filed a formal objection, but withdrew its objections after 
caving into pressure from the United States, which promised not to use 
punitive trade sanctions under its domestic law that it had designed as an 
enforcement mechanism of the IWC.73 Japan currently whales, but osten-
sibly for “research purposes.”74 The former USSR (now the Russian Fed-
eration) also objected to the moratorium, and while it never officially 
withdrew its objection, it nevertheless ceased all operations in 1987 and 
generally shifted its policies towards conservation. 75  Norway filed a 
timely objection and continued to object to measures such as an IWC 
decision to protect minke whales on the basis that the decision was not 
                                                 
 68. See Kobayashi, supra note 9, at 193. 
 69. See id. at 194–95. 
 70. These movements can be drawn into three general groups: conservationists, preservation-
ists, and animal welfare activists. See id. at 196. Conservationists are concerned with sustainable 
practices of exploiting natural resources, preservationists reject any scientific evidence of sustainable 
use and reject any killing of whales—based on their own moral reasons—and animal welfare activ-
ists are concerned with the human treatment of the whales. Id. 
 71. See id. at 197. 
 72. See id. at 198–99. Membership had more than doubled from the original 15 to 39. Id. 
 73. See id. at 199. For more on the United States’ domestic enforcement of the IWC, see infra 
Part III. 
 74. See Stein, supra note 4, at 169; see also Kobayashi, supra note 9, at 199. 
 75. See Kobayashi, supra note 9, at 199. 
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supported by scientific evidence.76 In 1991, Norway announced that it 
would not hunt any minke whales after it failed to lift the ban on minkes, 
and for the first time since the seventeenth century, Norway did not kill 
any whales that year.77 In 1992, however, due to the importance Norway 
placed on whaling, Norway reversed and announced that it would resume 
commercial whaling in 1993.78 The United States led a fifteen-nation 
group in making a formal statement urging Norway to reconsider, but 
Norway refused because it was legally within its rights.79 Since then, 
Norway has continued to hunt whales annually, and a variety of attempts 
by the United States to bring Norway back under the moratorium have 
been largely unsuccessful, as will be discussed in the next Part of this 
Note. 
III. ANTAGONISTIC PAST AND PRESENT MECHANISMS 
This Part discusses why previous attempts to bring Norway into 
“compliance” with international law (in the form of the ICRW ban on 
whaling) have been ultimately unsuccessful. These previous attempts are 
characterized in this Note as “antagonistic” because they did little to seek 
compromise. Three general categories of approaches have been attempt-
ed so far. First, applying pressure through formal diplomatic channels 
has technically worked with Japan80 but has not been successful with 
Norway.81 Second, the United States made attempts to domestically en-
force what it viewed as breaches of the purpose of the ICRW, but the 
United States Supreme Court effectively shot down that approach.82 Fi-
nally, due to problems with the two methods above, the more recent and 
controversial approach suggests that effective enforcement of conserva-
tionist values can come from private activist parties, ranging from bans 
on goods to acts of interference that may rise close to the level of pira-
cy.83 Each of these approaches will be examined in turn. 
                                                 
 76. Norwegians Reject Decision to Protect the Minke Whale, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1985, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1985/10/22/world/norwegians-reject-decision-to-protect-the-minke-
whale.html. 
 77. See Stein, supra note 4, at 169. 
 78. See id. at 170. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See id. at 168–69. Albeit with arguably disastrous results in terms of effectiveness because 
Japan simply used the moratorium’s scientific research exception to continue whaling. Id. 
 81. See, e.g., Halverson, supra note 6, at 147 (“Norway continues to prove it will withstand 
threats and criticism in order to maintain Norwegian cultural identity and sovereignty.”).  
 82. See Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 222 (1986). 
 83. Anthony L.I. Moffa, Comment, Two Competing Models of Activism, One Goal: A Case 
Study of Anti-Whaling Campaigns in the Southern Ocean, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 201 (2012). Acts of 
violence at sea against Japanese whalers by the private organization Sea Shepherd may constitute 
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A. Formal Pressure 
The reasons for the United States’ change in policy in the years be-
tween the creation of the IWC and the moratorium in 1982—from being 
at most a passive bystander to a staunch advocate of a newly emerging 
norm—is not entirely clear at first glance. One view is that the United 
States saw gains in terms of a “reputational advantage” because simply 
opposing the taking of whales was essentially a no-cost means of appear-
ing as a “good environmental citizen” or having “green credentials.”84 
There was, however, a cost in pursuing that path in the form of damaged 
trade relations, so some argue that the reputation benefit alone does not 
account for the normative change in United States policy.85 To some ex-
tent, it appears that the shift in the IWC and in the normative policies of 
important previous whaling nations, such as the United States and Aus-
tralia, was due to the work of environmental non-governmental organiza-
tions. These organizations influenced the public and world leaders by 
pushing concepts, such as the immorality of whaling and the intelligence 
of whales, as normative reasons to oppose the practice entirely, instead 
of viewing it in terms of utilitarian conservationism.86 This signals that 
instead of being merely a strategic choice by the United States, a symp-
tomatic change of identity occurred in the United States.87 Such a change 
in identity, this Note posits, helps explain why the United States used its 
power as a leader, both in a global sense and within the context of the 
IWC, to formally pressure the moratorium dissenters to accept the ban on 
whaling. With a majority of the votes in the IWC—and an underlying 
impossibility of compromise between preservationist states and envi-
ronmental non-governmental organizations and conservationist whaling 
states and industry88—the United States had little reason to work with the 
dissenters. Instead, it formally pressured them against the backdrop of 
unrelenting global public opinion against the dissenting whaling states. 
The United States applied formal pressure against Japan by certify-
ing Japan under the Pelly Amendment to the Fisherman’s Protection Act 
of 1967.89 However, because Japan made statements that it was going to 
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improve conservation efforts, President Ford used his power of discretion 
in the Amendment to decline to impose actual economic sanctions.90 The 
pressure was still technically successful in that Japan did officially with-
draw its objection to the 1982 moratorium.91 In terms of practical suc-
cess, however, it was at best temporary and at worst detrimental because 
Japan continues to whale to this day under the guise of “research,” which 
is permitted by the ICRW requirement because the carcass is fully uti-
lized after the “research.”92 
Norway, on the other hand, was less receptive to formal pressures 
from the United States. Although Norway did cease whaling operations 
from 1991 to 1993, possibly as the result of United States-led pressure in 
the IWC,93 the mere fact that Norway resumed and continues whaling to 
the present day demonstrates that any further formal pressure by the 
United States is not likely to produce any results that are positive for the 
United States’ presumptively long-term goals of preservation. Therefore, 
such tactics should be abandoned as they will at best do little but damage 
relations with a trading partner and at worst encourage Norway to take 
the Japanese approach and begin “researching” whales, which circum-
vents the spirit of regulation and would only further weaken the IWC. 
B. Domestic Enforcement 
In conjunction with the United States’ newfound normative ap-
proach to whaling, the United States noticed the conspicuous lack of any 
enforcement power within the IWC, such that even if Norway were bla-
tantly violating international law by whaling despite the moratorium, 
there were no penalties under the IWC scheme.94 As a leader in the inter-
national community, the United States Congress took it upon itself to gift 
the Executive Branch of the United States with a domestic enforcement 
mechanism to threaten dissenters of the moratorium, which came in the 
form of the Pelly95 and Packwood-Magnuson96 Amendments. The two 
amendments give the Secretary of Commerce the ability to determine if 
foreign nations are “diminish[ing] the effectiveness” of the ICRW. If so, 
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the Secretary is to certify that fact to the President of the United States, 
who may apply sanctions according to the two amendments.97 The Pelly 
Amendment gives the President the discretion of banning imports of fish 
products from nations that are “reducing the effectiveness” of any inter-
national fishery conservation agreement, which would include the 
ICRW. 98  The Packwood-Magnuson Amendment imposes economic 
sanctions in the form of reducing the offending nation’s share of fishing 
in U.S. waters, but the Secretary may also certify a nation when it specif-
ically violates the ICRW—thus making Congress’s intent to enforce it 
directly clear.99 
Two major problems have surfaced in application of the amend-
ments. First, even if a nation is certified, it is within the discretion of the 
President to apply Pelly sanctions. Second, the United States Supreme 
Court held in Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society 
that even though the Secretary had the authority to determine whether a 
nation’s whaling in excess of quotas diminished the effectiveness of the 
IWC, this determination did not impose a mandatory obligation on the 
Secretary to certify that every quota violation necessarily failed that 
standard.100 Perhaps as a result of Japan Whaling, the United States has 
used the amendments more as negotiating tools to apply formal pressure 
than as a direct enforcement mechanism; in fact, the United States only 
applied sanctions twice—both times under Packwood-Magnusson, and 
never under Pelly.101 Norway itself was certified several times, but nei-
ther President George H.W. Bush nor President Bill Clinton ever applied 
sanctions, possibly because they did not want to injure trade relations 
with Norway.102 
Furthermore, some argue that if the United States actually applied 
sanctions, it would violate international law by contravening the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as a unilateral trade restriction 
and possibly violate the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS).103 Therefore, domestic enforcement through the Pelly 
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and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments holds little promise in pressuring 
Norway to accept the ban, especially since the more stringent trade sanc-
tions are at the discretion of the President, who is often mindful of other 
political concerns regarding relations with Norway. Given the inability of 
environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) to file suit un-
der the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments to force the Secre-
tary to certify every quota as a violation, these organizations began to 
look for other methods to accomplish their agendas. 
C. Private Activism 
Due in part to the failure of the above methods to attain preserva-
tionist goals, ENGOs have taken a more recognizable role both in shap-
ing the development of international law and in enforcing it through the 
use of “activism.”104 ENGOs have taken two general approaches in their 
activism: “protest” activism and “interventionist” activism. 105  Protest 
activism is an approach favored by ENGOs such as Greenpeace in recent 
years and represents a more law-promoting approach through the use of 
legal activities—such as consumer boycotts, protests, and awareness-
raising campaigns—in order to put indirect pressure on states and inter-
national legal organs to effectuate desired policy changes.106 The other 
approach, interventionist activism, represents a more vigilante approach 
favored by groups such as Sea Shepherd—who has been popularized by 
television programming of its activities against Japanese whalers in the 
Antarctic—through the use of nearly, if not patently, illegal applications 
of direct force to enforce the private views of ENGOs on the content of 
international law.107 
Protest activism is not very controversial and should even be en-
couraged because it supports the rule of law in the international regula-
tion of commercial whaling. In comparison to the formal mechanisms of 
pressure described above, protest activism arguably has been more suc-
cessful in effecting change in the whaling industry, at least in Japan.108 
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Consumer boycotts and protests are generally protected forms of behav-
ior in the states where they occur. Thus, this form of activism operates 
within a legal framework and should be encouraged and accepted under 
international law.109 
Conversely, interventionist activism is a much more pernicious 
threat to the rule of law. Interventionist activism consists of the use of 
active harassment of whaling fleets. The effectiveness of this strategy is 
demonstrated by the efforts of Sea Shepherd in contributing to an early 
close to the 2011 Japanese whaling season in the Southern Ocean.110 Yet, 
effectiveness alone should not be the benchmark by which actions are 
evaluated, for surely war is a more directly effective means of accom-
plishing state objectives than diplomatic compromise, yet the interna-
tional prohibition of aggressive war is well-established.111 Even those 
who support interventionist activism should be aware that it comes with 
the price of threatening international rule of law.112 Favored methods of 
interventionists include ramming whaling vessels, throwing butyric acid, 
disabling propellers, and boarding vessels.113 Such acts were only once 
held to constitute piracy as violations of UNCLOS in a Belgian case,114 
so there is little precedent to prosecute Sea Shepherd for piracy.115 Fur-
thermore, one of the gravest dangers of interventionists is that they be-
lieve they are “enforcing” existing international law by relying on non-
binding declaratory resolutions, such as the World Charter for Nature, 
and giving it undue weight as some sort of binding instrument enforcea-
ble by private parties—apparently by any means necessary.116 Even as-
suming that interventionist activism is the most effective means to com-
pel nations like Norway to comply with the ban on commercial whaling 
and that there is “global acquiescence towards the Sea Shepherds’ cam-
paign”117 and other similar interventionist actions, the facial illegality of 
such approaches is diametrically opposed to the efforts of civilization to 
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be ruled by laws and not violence. The United States, as a world leader, 
should reject any argument to outsource its IWC compliance efforts to 
private ENGOs. Because there are no currently effective legal means 
available to the United States to compel Norway to end its commercial 
whaling, a new approach is needed where both the long-term environ-
mental goals of the United States and the cultural values of Norway can 
both be respected. 
IV. A PROPOSED SHIFT TO COOPERATIVE MECHANISMS 
The best way for the United States to achieve its own long-term en-
vironmental and diplomatic policy goals is to work cooperatively with 
Norway to persuade the other members of the IWC to abandon the mora-
torium in favor of a quota standard that is culturally inclusive and sup-
ported by contemporary scientific data. The United States Congress 
seems completely opposed to commercial whaling, based on a recent 
resolution in which the U.S. House of Representatives proclaimed that 
the United States should “use all appropriate measures to end commer-
cial whaling in all of its forms, including scientific and other special 
permit whaling . . . .”118 Such statements that refute even scientific pur-
poses strongly indicate an unyielding preservationist attitude. Moreover, 
when the United States demands that Norway cease all whaling without 
giving anything in return, the preservationist attitude appears merely an-
tagonistic and makes no gains for U.S. policy. The far better choice is for 
the United States to work cooperatively to achieve accountable interna-
tional regulation for Norwegian whaling under the IWC. 
As has been discussed so far, the methods used to insist on a total 
ban are ineffective and cause tension within the IWC.119 The Scientific 
Committee of the IWC caused great tension by reporting that some spe-
cies are no longer in need of complete protection, which has prompted 
pro-whaling members to argue that the complete moratorium is con-
travening the basic principles of the ICRW.120 Because the IWC is a vol-
untary international body with little or no enforcement power, continued 
insistence on the moratorium could lead to the dissolution of the IWC or 
withdrawal of pro-whaling members, some of whom have already begun 
to form other organizations.121 
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In addition, certain considerations make an agreement on a quota 
with Norway particularly appealing.122 First, cooperation is the only way 
to achieve compliance in a non-binding international legal scheme such 
as the IWC, as there simply is no enforcement mechanism, and straining 
pressure on sovereign states can result in their non-compliance or aban-
donment of the organization. Also, there are strong indications that the 
whaling industry in Norway is naturally declining,123 so in the long-term 
the United States would have little to lose from supporting a lift of a ban 
in terms of environmental policy (assuming that the United States has the 
long-term goal of reducing catches to zero). Based on the failure to make 
Norway conform to preservationist values, a preservationist-focused 
strategy is not the best policy for the United States to pursue if it wants to 
bring Norway into “compliance” with the IWC. The United States must 
realize that whaling is a source of national pride for Norway—one that it 
views as a symbol of its identity and culture, even its sovereignty.124 
Norway has withstood threats and critics in the international community 
for three decades, so further attempts at coercion by the United States 
will likely be futile. 
In 2006, another author of a law review article on this subject had 
“no doubt” that the momentum in the IWC had been shifting towards a 
lift on the moratorium in the near future,125 yet seven years later, the 
moratorium remains in place. Change will not likely occur without the 
support of the United States, who is a key leader in the international 
community and within the IWC. Therefore, the United States should shift 
its policy from what seems like an antagonistic and preservationist mind-
set to a cooperative conservation mindset. As long as Norway objects to 
the moratorium, it is within its legal rights to continue to hunt whales, 
limited only by what its own scientists say is a sustainable quota amount. 
To be sure, Norway vigorously contends that its scientists do not lack 
integrity,126 which implies that Norway believes it is able to self-regulate 
under safe scientific principles, even if the international community is 
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unwilling to consider such an approach. Even assuming that Norway’s 
research is unbiased, it is still wiser policy for the international regulation 
of whaling to be observed by neutral international observers because 
whales are a shared global resource. Thus, it is more prudent for the 
United States and Norway to compromise on a sustainable quota that can 
be governed by an international body. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Whaling is an ancient practice that has developed in modern times 
largely from efforts by Norwegians. Whaling continues today due to 
commercial uses and long-held Norwegian cultural values. After nearly 
driving whales to extinction, there was a need for regulation of commer-
cial whaling. The failed attempts of industry and domestic regulations 
necessitated international regulation, culminating in the ICRW, which 
promulgated the IWC to regulate modern whaling. Under the United 
States’ leadership, the IWC instituted a ban on all commercial whaling in 
1982. Norway objected and stopped whaling for a time, but resumed in 
1992 despite international criticism. Norway continues to whale today, in 
part, because it views whaling as an important aspect of its cultural iden-
tity. Unfortunately, efforts by the United States to urge Norway to accept 
the moratorium have failed. The failure of formal pressures with Japan—
which ceased its objection but now whales more controversially by 
claiming the research permit exception—indicates that insisting Norway 
accept the moratorium will likewise be ineffective. Similarly, attempts 
by the United States to enforce its view of the IWC failed domestically 
because it relied in large part on the willingness of the United States to 
risk relations with an important trade partner by imposing economic 
sanctions, which may in itself violate international law regarding free 
trade and the seas. Finally, the more effective methods used by ENGOs 
and private interest groups, such as Sea Shepherd, are controversial, con-
trary to the rule of law, and may even amount to piracy. Because all of 
these methods have failed, the best option for the United States is to 
adopt a cooperative approach with Norway that is centered on reaching 
an agreeable quota that is scientifically sustainable. For in this way, the 
United States and the international community can hold Norway ac-
countable to ensure that whales—a shared, valuable, and global re-
source—are not threatened. 
 
